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MANDAMUS AND RECUSAL: PROMOTING PUBLIC

CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Because courts control neither the purse nor the sword, their authority ultimately rests on publicfaith in those who don the robe.'

I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary occupies a unique place in the American system of
government as an impartial, nonpartisan arbiter of justice.2 The judiciary
aspires to preserve both the reality and the appearance of its neutrality.
Recent public debate examining the neutrality of Supreme Court Justices
highlights the importance of promoting public confidence in the judiciary
by preserving the appearance of impartiality. 4 Most recently, Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia raised eyebrows when he joined Vice Presi1 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 817-18 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
2 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (considering judicial involvement in drafting of Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by United States Sentencing Commission). Justice Blackmun attested that the "legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately
depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship." Id.
3 See White, 536 U.S. at 721-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 407) (expressing concern that judicial involvement in policy formation may erode public
confidence in judicial impartiality).
4 See Dave Denison, Judging the Judges, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, March 7, 2004, at
HI (describing use of mantra "judicial activism" in recent political debate); see also Linda
Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Consider Case on "Under God" in Pledge to Flag, N.Y.
TIMES, October 15, 2003, at Al (noting Scalia's recusal from case considering constitutionality of Pledge of Allegiance after publicly expressing views on litigated issue); see also
David G. Savage & Richard A. Serrano, Ginsburg dejends NOW involvement, L.A. TIMES,
March 14, 2004, available at http://www.boston.connews/nation/articles/2004/03/14/
ginsburg-defends NOWinvolvement/ (reporting Ginsburg's defense of her involvement in
NOW Legal Defense and Education funds yearly lecture series); Christopher Marquis,
Contesting the Vote, Challenging a Justice: Job of Thomas's Wife Raises Conflict-ofInterest Questions, N.Y. TIMES, December 12, 2000, at A26 (reporting Virginia Lamp
Thomas's work collecting resumes for Bush cabinet appointments during pendency of
Florida recount case); Jill Zuckman, Justice Scalia's Son a Lawyer in Firm Representing
Bush Before Top Court, CHI. TRIB., November 29, 2000, at 13 (noting Scalia's son employed by firm representing Bush in Florida recount challenge); Id. (describing Rhenquist's
decision to sit on antitrust case even though son employed by firm representing litigant
Microsoft); Neil A. Lewis, Justice Breyer Severs Ties to Lloyd's Syndicate, N.Y. TIMES,
November 11, 1994, at A24 (describing Breyer's sale of Lloyd's investment due to recurring conflict of interest).
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dent Dick Cheney on an overnight duck-hunting trip on the Louisiana
bayou.5 Critics questioned the trip's propriety because two weeks earlier
the Supreme Court had granted certiorari to review discovery orders mandating disclosure of documents produced by the National Energy Policy
Development Group, an advisory committee chaired by Cheney. 6 Emphatically denying any impropriety, Scalia denied litigant Sierra Club's
motion requesting his recusal. 7
Constitutional due process guarantees litigants the right to a trial before a fair and objective judge.8 Judicial impartiality is of a constitutional
nature, thereby requiring courts to guard against even the appearance of
bias. 9 The judiciary considers neutrality so fundamental to the integrity of
the judicial process that the judicial code of ethics mandates impartiality. ' 0

See David G. Savage, Trip with Cheney Puts Ethics Spotlight on Scalia, L.A.
TIMES, January 17, 2004, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/lana-ducks17jan17,17777211.story?coll+la-headlines-nation (reporting controversy engendered by Scalia's duck-hunting trip with Cheney).
6 See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 958 (2003) (granting review of
appellate court judgment denying government's petition for writ of mandamus vacating
district court judge's discovery order); Gina Holland, Scalia, Cheney trip stirs protests;
Critics see conflict of interest, CHI. TRIB., January 31, 2004, at 14 (reporting on Chief Justice Rhenquist's dismissal of inquiries by Senators Patrick Leahy and Joseph Lieberman
into propriety of Scalia and Cheney's trip); Too Close for Comfort: Scalia should recuse
himself from case against Dick Cheney, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, January 23, 2004, at 10A
(arguing Scalia should recuse himself from Cheney case because appearance of impropriety
would irreparably damage public confidence); Duck Blind Justice, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
January 21, 2004, at 12A (arguing trip created appearance of impropriety because Cheney's
conduct critical to substance of appeal).
7 See Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 124 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (2004) (concluding
that Justice's impartiality could not reasonably be questioned). In denying Sierra Club's
motion, Scalia emphasized the consequences of recusal at the Supreme Court level on the
outcome of cases. See id. at 1394-95. Scalia also asserts that allowing the allegations of
investigative journalists to dictate recusal decisions would severely undermine the presumption ofjudicial neutrality. See id. at 1402. In addition, Scalia noted that friendship between
high-ranking officials of the executive and judicial branches is common throughout history.
See id. at 1400-01.
8 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (holding trial by judge with direct
financial interest in case denial of procedural due process); Commonwealth Coatings Corp.
v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (extending Tumev's constitutional impartiality
requirement to members of arbitration panels).
9 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (disqualifying judge to
protect due process rights and to guard against appearance of impropriety despite lack of
actual bias).
5

10 See MODEL RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(b)(5)(1999). The code states in

pertinent part:
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall not,
in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic
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Recusal statutes provide one mechanism for ensuring judicial neutrality. " Modern recusal statutes allow for the disqualification of judges
during trial due to either actual or apparent bias. 2 These statutes are principally concerned with fostering public faith in the administration of justice. 3
Petitions to appellate courts for writs of mandamus ordering reassignment during litigation of the case-in-chief or on remand offer litigants
an alternative method of remedying judicial prejudice.14 Mandamus is not5
a writ of right, and is traditionally considered an extraordinary remedy.
Appellate review of the denial of motions to recuse, whether or not via a
writ of mandamus, challenges the relationship between the federal courts
of appeals and the district courts. 16
This Note addresses the writ of mandamus as an instrument for protecting judicial impartiality and promoting public confidence in the judicial
process. This Note also contemplates factors the federal courts of appeals
consider when invoking their power to order cases reassigned by the district courts. Part II chronicles the history of supervisory and advisory
mandamus; the evolution of recusal for bias; and, finally, the interrelationship of mandamus, recusal, and the final decision rule. '7 Part III addresses

the courts of appeals' varying approaches to evaluating mandamus petitions requesting the reassignment of cases for alleged bias or prejudice. 8
Part IV contemplates the broadening scope of supervisory mandamus and
status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others subject to the judge's
direction and control to do so. Id.
" See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2002) (outlining procedure for disqualification based on
affidavit); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2002) (outlining procedure for disqualification based on
motion of party or judge). See generally 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE
63.61 (3d ed. 1999) (detailing procedural differences between §§ 144 and
455(a)). Section 144 requires the party asserting bias or prejudice to file an affidavit at least
ten days prior to the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, unless the
party can show cause for failure to file a timely affidavit. See id. Section 455, however,
does not impose a time limit upon the party filing a motion seeking the judge's disqualification. See id. The moving party must file the motion as soon as it becomes aware of facts
demonstrating partiality. See id.
12 See FED. R. Civ. P. 63 advisory committee's note (1999) (highlighting substantial
change in rule that includes disqualification for bias).
13 See 12 MOORE, supra note 11, 63.20[3] (stressing requirement primarily concerned with public-at-large's confidence in integrity of judicial process).
"4 See In re DaimlerChrysler Corp., 294 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 2002) (ordering
reassignment of case on remand due to judicial hostility toward petitioner).
'5 See Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (citing mandamus proper only when
no other remedy at law available); 55 C.J.S. § 10 (1998) (characterizing grant or denial of
writ as within discretion of court).
16 See infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (describing tension between final
decision rule and review through mandamus petitions of orders denying recusal).
17 See infra notes 20-63 and accompanying text.
18See infra notes 64-85 and accompanying text.

16

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. IX

the propriety of employing mandamus as an alternative to traditional methods of judicial disqualification. 19 Part V concludes that a broad approach
coupled with clear procedural rules would not only strengthen public faith
in the judicial process, but would also maintain the presumption of judicial
impartiality.
II. HISTORY

A.

Evolution of Mandamus

The All Writs Act grants the federal courts of appeals the power to
issue writs to the lower courts either mandating or prohibiting certain action. 2 ' Traditionally, such writs issued only when an appellate court
deemed lower court action a "usurpation of power.",2' Such usurpation
usually consisted of an exercise of jurisdiction amounting to a clear and
indisputable impropriety. 22 The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure assert that mandamus will lie only upon a showing of an indisputable right to
relief or in exceptional circumstances . 23 In addition, the federal rules require petitioners to demonstrate not only a clear abuse of discretion or conduct amounting to a usurpation
of judicial authority, but also the lack of
24
alternative means for relief.

Despite these stringent requirements, however, the variety of situations in which the courts of appeals grant writs of mandamus has broad-

I9 See inra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
2( See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2002) (granting all courts created by Congress power to

issue all writs necessary and appropriate in aid of their jurisdictions).
21 See De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)
(granting writ and reversing injunction issued by district court). Recognizing that the issued
injunction fell outside the scope of the case, the Court determined that any harm created by
the injunction could not be redressed through a decision on the merits. See id. at 217. The
Court therefore held that equity jurisdiction did not reach the issues considered by the district court in granting the injunction. See id. at 221. The Court clarified that mandamus,
while not appropriate to correct "mere error," may be used to correct errors arising from
lower courts' "usurpation of power." Id. at 217. See also Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal
Methods of Jtudicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 243, 288 (1993) (describing traditional
standards for issuance of writ as "exacting").
22 See Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus under the All Writs Act, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 595, 599-600 (1973) (describing definitions of "power" in early judicial opinions).
The author suggests that "power" as used in De Beers is a flexible concept. See id. at 599.
While mandamus is inappropriate to review "mere error," mandamus need not be confined
to jurisdictional errors. See id.
23 See FED. R. App. P. 21 (setting forth procedure for petition, deriving power to issue
writs from 28 U.S.C. § 1651).
24 See 12 MOORE, supra note I I at 63.71 (explaining Federal Rule of Apellate Procedure Rule 21's two-step process to obtain writ of mandamus ordering recusal).
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ened. 25 In the landmark case La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 26 the Supreme

Court determined that the federal courts of appeals may properly employ
writs of mandamus to perform a supervisory function over the federal district courts. 27 The Court considered this supervisory role essential to the
effective administration of justice. 28 La Buy held that the federal courts of
appeals may use writs of mandamus to prevent or deter an action of the
district court that may or may not occur in the future. 29 This sort of interlocutory appeal circumvents the final decision rule and contradicts the
principle of mandamus as an extraordinary remedy.
The notion of advisory mandamus, in which appellate courts advise
lower courts on novel issues of law through consideration of mandamus
petitions, flows from principles supporting supervisory mandamus. 3I In
Schlagenhaufv. Holder,32 the Supreme Court carved out an exception to
the collateral order doctrine in which appellate courts may review novel
questions of law on an interlocutory basis.33 In Schlangenhauf, the petitioner was the first litigant ordered to undergo a physical examination as
part of pretrial discovery in a negligence action. 34 The petitioner immediately sought a writ of mandamus from the appellate court, challenging the
district court's power to compel such an examination. 35 This petition cir25

See Geyh, supra note 21 at 288 (noting writ's use to discourage or prevent errone-

ous practices, as well as to resolve novel questions of law); see also infra note 32-33 and
accompanying text (describing innovative uses of mandamus).
352 U.S. 249 (1957).
27 See id. at 255-56 (deeming appellate courts' use of prerogative writs to review
interlocutory matters proper exercise of discretion).
28 See id. at 259 (noting issuance of writs within judges' sound discretion).
"We
believe that supervisory control of the District Courts by the Court of Appeals is necessary
to proper judicial administration in the federal system." Id. Cf Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1480-82 (1984) (critiquing expansive use of supervisory power by intermediate federal courts despite lack of express
statutory grant).
29 See Note, supra note 22 at 609 (discussing supervisory mandamus as appellate tool
for deterrence of future judicial behavior).
30 See id. at 610 (asserting supervisory mandamus falls outside traditional use of
writ); see also infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (explaining final decision rule).
31 See Note, supra note 22 at 611 (explaining appellate court supervision of lower
courts may extend to settling novel questions of law).
32 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
33 See id. at 110 (holding lower court's order constituted abuse of discretion that
may
be addressed through mandamus petition). The petitioner argued that the district court
lacked the power to order him to submit to a physical examination because his physical
condition was not "in controversy" as defined by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id.
34 See id. (stating challenged order for examination first of its kind in any federal
decision).
35 See id. at 109 (describing petitioner's course of action in challenging order for
medical examination).
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cumvented the final decision rule because it requested review of an order
that was neither dispositive nor a final judgment. 36 Nevertheless, the Court
declared that when the issue under review in the petition for mandamus is a
"basic, undecided question," an appellate court can properly advise a district court of the contours of the applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 37 Advisory mandamus thus allows the appellate court to review issues of first impression during the litigation of a case without any finding
that the district court has exceeded its jurisdiction.38
Following the advent of supervisory and advisory mandamus, the
use of the writ has expanded into other areas. 39 For example, in the antitrust litigation producing In re InternationalBusiness Machines Corporation (IBM), 40 the Second Circuit invoked the writ to order the district court
to end the convoluted thirteen-year-long litigation.4 ' In the recent asbestos
tort case In re DaimlerChryslerCorporation,42 the Fifth Circuit issued a
writ of mandamus ordering the case reassigned on remand. 43 DaimlerChrysler illustrates mandamus as a form of appellate review that enables
litigants to challenge a judge's denial of a recusal motion without awaiting
final judgment. 44
36

See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2002) (granting circuit courts appellate power over "final

orders," except those immediately appealable as of right to Supreme Court).
37 See Schlagenhauf. 379 U.S. at 110 (stating appellate courts may use discretionary
powers in determining whether or not to grant writs).
38 See Note, supra, note 22 at 616 (exploring implication of Court's determination
that advisory mandamus may be used to clarify novel issues). The author contends that
Schlagenhauf authorizes appellate courts to grant mandamus petitions solely in an effort to
expeditiously settle novel questions of law without reference to the traditional mandamus
"power" analysis. See id. But see In re Atlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 139-40 (1st Cir.
2002) (holding petitioner need not show irreparable harm when mandamus petition is advisory in nature). In Atlantic Pipe, petitioner's opponent argued mandamus was improper
because petitioner would not suffer irreparable harm from nonbonding arbitration. See id.
Rejecting this argument, the First Circuit held that mandamus was proper because the petition addressed a "systematically important issue as to which the court has not yet spoken."
Id. at 140.
39See Steven Wisotsky, Extraordinarv Writs: "Appeal" by Other Means, 26 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 577, 586-91 (2003) (detailing use of mandamus to challenge various discovery orders). Litigants may file mandamus petitions to prevent irreparable harm resulting
from compelled disclosure of privileged information or trade secrets. See id. In addition,
litigants or news agencies affected by pretrial gag orders may contest such orders through
mandamus petitions. See id.
40 687 F.2d 591, 597 (2d Cir. 1982).
" See id. at 597 (stating former party-opponents both sought writ of mandamus to
end litigation after judge refused to do so). See generally Maryellen Fullerton, Exploring
the Far Reaches of Mandamus, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 1131 (1983) (discussing Second Circuit's use of mandamus to end litigation in IBM).
42 294 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2002).
43 See DaimlerChr'sler,294 F.3d at 701 (granting mandamus petition requesting
reassignment on remand due to trial judge's displayed hostility toward defendants).
See id. at 701 (ordering reassignment of case on remand despite judge's "good faith
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Statutory DisqualificationMechanisms

Recusal is the statutory method of judicial disqualification due to
disability, bias, or partiality.45 When a judge is deemed "unable to proceed," the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guide his or her replacement.4 6
Another judge may proceed with the trial if the original judge is unable to
continue because of death, illness, disability, retirement, or resignation.47
The statutory phrase "unable to proceed" is now also interpreted consistently with disqualification. 48 First, disqualification is warranted where a
judge, due to a personal stake in the litigation, has a direct bias either
against or in favor of a party. 49 Second, disqualification is required when a
judge may be tempted to base his judgments on personal knowledge of the
facts at issue.50
Courts have construed district court judges' duty to recuse themselves for bias or prejudice as an objective one requiring judges to avoid

effort" to regain impartiality). See also Karen Nelson Moore, Appellate Review of Judicial
DisqualificationDecisions in the Federal Courts, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (1984) (noting
most courts assume propriety of immediate review of denials of recusal motions).
45 See FED. R. Civ. P. 63 (detailing district court's power to reassign case when initial
trial judge deemed "unable to proceed"). See generally 12 MOORE, supra note 11 63.20
(explaining nature and scope of impartiality requirement, as well as standards for determining impartiality). A judge's impartiality must be evaluated objectively. Id. at 1 63.20[4].
Moore observes that "[t]he standard for recusal is whether a reasonable person, with knowledge and understanding of all the relevant facts, would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Id.
46 See FED. R. Civ. P. 63. Rule 63 states the following:
If a trial or hearing has been commenced and the judge is unable to proceed, any
other judge may proceed with it upon certifying familiarity with the record and
determining that the proceedings in the case may be completed without prejudice
to the parties. Ina hearing or trial without a jury, the successor judge shall at the
request of a party recall any witness whose testimony is material and disputed and
who is available to testify again without undue burden. The successor judge may
also recall any other witness.
Id.

47 See 12 MOORE,supra note II at

63.20 (offering definitions of the phrase "unable

to proceed").
48 See 12 MOORE, supra note I I at
63.03[3] (explaining 1991 rule amendments
broadened scope of "inability" to include judicial bias).
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 455 (2002) (requiring judge's recusal when he or she has pecuniary interest in litigation, has served as counsel for party, or has family members serving as
counsel for party).
50 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (1995) (ordering reassignment after determining trial judge based finding on his own research about Microsoft's
practices, not on evidence presented at trial); 12 MOORE, supra note 11, at 63.20 (detailing
disqualification for bias and extrajudicial knowledge). But see Liteky v. United States, 510
U.S. 540, 548-49 (1994) (limiting extrajudicial source doctrine as one factor among many
considered in determining judicial bias).
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even the appearance of partiality.5 ' Judges must recuse themselves when
an objective observer could reasonably question their neutrality, regardless
of whether they are actually biased.52
When the presiding judge does not pursue recusal, a party may
move for disqualification.53 Courts have also noted that a judge has as
much of a duty not to recuse him or herself when disqualification is not
warranted as to recuse when disqualification is warranted.54
C.

Mandamus and the FinalDecision Rule

The Judicial Code grants the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review
"final decisions" from the district courts. 55 Final decisions are generally
51 See Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988) (describ-

ing goal of § 455(a) to protect against appearance of partiality). The Court held that the
judge need not even be personally aware of the facts giving rise to the appearance of partiality. See id. But see Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 879 (Rhenquist, C.J., dissenting) (asserting appearance standard did not require judge's disqualification where judge lacked actual knowledge of financial interest in litigation).
'2 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2002) (stating judge subject to disqualification when partiality reasonably questioned); Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860 (characterizing inquiry as independent of judge's actual knowledge); Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety:
Deciding When a Judge's hnpartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 55, 71 (2000) (noting objective standard requires awareness by judges that
observers of judicial process more likely to question judicial impartiality). In Liljeberg, the
Court recognized that "people who have not served on the bench are often too willing to
indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges." Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at
864-65. But see Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86
HARV. L. REV. 736, 747 (1973) (considering implications of applying strict applying appearance of bias standard to judicial disqualification analysis). The author posits that an
increased willingness by appellate judges to order disqualification of trial judges arguably
undermines the presumption ofjudicial neutrality. See id.
" See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (permitting parties to file motion and affidavit attesting to
judge's perceived bias and requesting reassignment).
54 See United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976) (noting affidavits
accompanying motion to recuse must establish personal rather than judicial bias). In Bray,
the appellant had not only written articles calling for the trial judge's impeachment, but also
collected signatures supporting the judge's removal. See id. In upholding the trial judge's
denial of appellant's motion, the court stressed that the appellant must show facts demonstrating the judge's personal bias or prejudice. See id. That the judge had previously expressed an opinion on a relevant point of law is insufficient to establish personal bias. See
id. See also Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1966) (asserting obligation
to proceed especially strong, absent colorable claim of prejudice, when judge highly familiar with case).
51 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Section 1291 states in pertinent part:
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District of
the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The ju-
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those decisions that terminate the litigation on the merits and leave the
court only to execute the judgment. 56 The collateral order doctrine, however, creates an exception to the final decision rule.5 Interlocutory appeals

are traditionally reserved for orders that are conclusive, resolve important
questions of law independent of the merits, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 58 Additionally, denial of a motion is
not a final order appealable as of right. 9
Mandamus has evolved into an accepted medium for interlocutory
review of orders denying recusal motions. 6' In this regard, current practice
diverges from the courts' traditional disfavor of mandamus as a medium
for interlocutory appeal. 6 1 Although a denial of a motion may be appealed
from the final judgment, courts have held that postponed appellate review
is insufficient to support granting mandamus relief.62 In addition, an in-

risdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be
limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this
title.
Id.
16

See Cunningham v. Hamilton County, 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999) (interpreting term

"final decision" in § 1291 to bar appellate review until final judgment entered); Midland
Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989) (explaining history of final decision rule). See generally Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41
YALE

L.J. 539, 548-51 (1932) (chronicling development of final decision rule).

57 See Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 204 (describing exception for "small category" of
appeals from orders not terminating litigation). The Court noted that issues inextricably
linked with the merits of a case fall outside the scope of the exception to the final decision
rule. See id. at 206.
-5 See id. (outlining characteristics of collateral order); Swint v. Chambers County
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 43 (1995) (determining order denying county commission's summary judgment motion not collateral order). But see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517
U.S. 706, 712 (1996) (holding remand to state court of removed case constitutes collateral
order because remand terminates federal jurisdiction).
59 See Jack B. Weinstein, The Limited Power o" the Federal Courts of Appeals to
Order a Case Reassigned to Another District Judge, 120 F.R.D. 267, 280 (1988) (arguing
courts of appeals lack jurisdiction in absence of final judgment or controlling question of
law); Nelson Moore, supra note 44 (establishing grant or denial of motion to recuse constitutes neither final order nor permissible exception). See generally 13A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3553 (2d ed. 1984)
(describing application of final decision rule).
6) See Geyh, supra note 21 at 297 (describing mandamus as remedy for appealing
denial of motion to recuse).
61 See Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 97 (1967) (disfavoring government's mandamus petition as form of piecemeal appeal); Fullerton, supra note 41 at 1150 (examining
IBM case as expansion of interlocutory appellate procedure).
62 See Weinstein, supra note 59, at 281 (characterizing courts of appeals' increasing
recourse to mandamus as expansion of appellate jurisdiction); Fullerton, supra note 41
(noting statutory and common law disapproval of piecemeal appeals).
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crease in interlocutory review risks straining the limited resources of the
district courts.63
III. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF
RECUSAL MOTIONS

A.

Circuits that Interpret "Appearance" Narrowly

The First Circuit maintains that mandamus is a discretionary writ
and should only issue upon a showing of clear error. 64 The First Circuit
requires that claims of bias be supported by a factual basis, and that the
factual allegations "provide what an objective, knowledgeable member of
the public would find to be a reasonable basis for doubting the judge's impartiality., 65 Comments related to the judge's opinion of parties, if based
on the party's behavior during the litigation, do not meet the First Circuit's
clear error standard. 66 While the recusal statutes aim to preserve the appearance of impartiality, they prohibit reassignment on the basis of unsupported speculation.67
When evaluating petitions for mandamus alleging judicial bias, the
Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits employ a three-part test tending to weigh
against reassignment. 68 These circuits consider whether the original judge
would have substantial difficulty setting aside previously-expressed views
63 See Weinstein, supra note 59 at 281. Judge Weinstein quotes from New York City
Housing Development v. Hart, 796 F.2d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1986), stating that "a practice of
ready recusal, coupled with a rule that requires the judge to whom the case is reassigned
revisit all of the rulings after the filing of a motion to disqualify, would multiply the work of
judges who already have much to do." Id. See also Nelson Moore, supra note 44 (noting
propriety of interlocutory review of judges' refusal to recuse entails balancing various interests). Nelson Moore intimates that immediate appellate review of orders denying motions
to recuse requires consideration of two basic policies; first, the interest in judicial economy
promoted by the final decision rule, and, second, the confidence in neutrality fostered by the
disqualification statutes. See id.
64 See In re Marisol Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting mandamus almost always withheld absent demonstration petitioner "clearly" entitled to relief).
65 See In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164, 167 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting In re
United States, 158 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1998)) (describing test as balance between preserving appearance of impartiality and preventing judge shopping). The court notes that
"recusal on demand would provide litigants with a veto against unwanted judges." Boston's
Children First,244 F.3d at 167.
66 See Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d at 220 (asserting judge forming negative opinion of
party does not necessarily constitute "clear showing" of bias or prejudice).
67 See id. (quoting United States v. Chantel, 902 F.2d 1018, 1023 (1st Cir. 1990))
(stating recusal may not be based on "irrational, highly tenuous speculation").
6P See Gary Young, High Court Unleashes Patent Splits, NAT'L L.J., July 15, 2002, at
B5 (describing circuit split regarding factors courts of appeals consider in determining
whether or not to reassign).
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or findings, whether reassignment is advisable to protect the appearance of
justice, and whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out
of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. 69 The
three-part test enables courts of appeals to avoid chastising trial judges
because, on balance, it reassigns cases in the interest of justice. 7°
B.

Circuits that Interpret "Appearance" Broadly

While the Third, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits maintain that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, they apply a test that tends to favor reassignment on remand. 7 These circuits consider reassignment appropriate
where the district court judge engages in conduct that generates an appearance of impropriety or lack of impartiality in the mind of a reasonable
member of the public. 72 They also stress that the appearance of an unbiased tribunal is essential to the 73
function of the judiciary "as a neutral, impartial administrator of justice.,
The Third Circuit contends that mandamus is an appropriate vehicle
to preserve the appearance of an impartial tribunal.74 Mandamus, in the
Third Circuit's view, fulfills the goal of not only correcting harm to the
litigant, but also preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.75 The Third Circuit holds that while review on appeal from
69

See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Med. Enter., Inc., 792 F.2d 906, 914 (9th Cir.

1986) (denying government's request for recusal after determining judge would not have
substantial difficulty conducting fair proceeding); In re IBM, 687 F.2d 591, 604 (2d Cir.
1982) (issuing mandamus directing district court judge to terminate litigation without ordering him to recuse); Bercheny v. Johnson, 633 F.2d 473, 476 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying threepart test to compel resentencing hearing before a different judge); United States v. Robin,
553 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (outlining three-part test, but tending more to reassignment
when judge sits as factfinder).
70 See Bercheny, 633 F.2d at 476 (noting reassignment order not intended
to comment
negatively upon original judge).
71 See Young, supra note 68 (outlining Third, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits' test for
reassignment).
72 See United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11 th Cir. 1989) (asserting
reassignment warranted when judge's conduct creates significant risk of undermining public confidence in judicial neutrality); United States v. White, 846 F.2d 678, 695 (11 th Cir.
1988) (ordering case reassigned on remand because judge's rulings adversely affected appearance of justice). In Torkington, the Eleventh Circuit considered the three prongs of the
Second Circuit test. Torkington, 874 F.2d at 1447. The court determined that the appearance of impartiality controlled and ordered the case reassigned on remand. See id.
73 See Haines v. Liggett Group, 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Torkington,
874 F.2d at 1447) (ordering reassignment after determining judge's comments published in
newspaper harmed appearance of neutrality).
4 See Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, 10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating
mandamus proper method of reviewing judge's order refusing to recuse under 28 U.S.C §
455).
75 See id. (stressing maintaining appearance of justice essential to accomplishing
judicial process goals). The court noted that the trial judge need not harbor actual bias
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final judgment may cure harm to the litigant, it fails to adequately cure
harm to public faith in judicial neutrality.76
C.

Seventh Circuit ProceduralRule

The Seventh Circuit frames the issue procedurally, requiring litigants to move for mandamus immediately after the judge grants or denies a
recusal motion under § 144.77 The court reviews a district court judge's
denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion or a showing of prejudice, but only if the petitioner requests a writ of mandamus immediately
following
• 711 the denial .7 Failure to request the writ at that time constitutes
waiver. Consequently, when a litigant raises a judicial bias argument for
the first time on appeal, the Seventh Circuit applies a plain error standard
of review.") District court judges are presumed impartial, and the writ is
not granted readily."8
D.

Fiflh Circuit Flexible Test

With its recent DaimlerChrysler decision, the Fifth Circuit signaled
that it will continue to consider both tests in determining whether reassignment on remand is warranted, but declined to definitively adopt either
approach.8 2 In DaimlerChr'sler, the district court judge characterized the
defendant automakers' behavior as "the most manipulative and craven
against the defendant to render mandamus proper. See id. Rather, reassignment serves to
promote public confidence in the judicial process. See id.
76 See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding mandamus petitions
challenging failure to recuse not prohibited by Prison Litigation Reform Act). In Madden,
the court echoed Primerica's assertion that mandamus petitions for reassignment assist in
curing not only harm to the litigants in a specific case, but also harm to the public's perception of the judicial process. See id.In addition, Madden is an example of mandamus in the
criminal context. See id. at 77.
17 See 12 MOORE, supra note I I at T 63.71 (describing Seventh Circuit procedural
requirements).
71 See United States v. Towns, 913 F.2d 434, 443 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding criminal
defendant's appeal from final decision of trial judge's refusal to recuse not properly preserved). The court makes clear that unlike motions to recuse for actual bias under § 144,
denials of motions brought pursuant to § 455 must be immediately appealed through a petition for mandamus. See id.
79 See United States v. Sidener, 876 F.2d 1334, 1336 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding defendant's recusal argument waived by failure to petition for mandamus immediately after denial of recusal motion).
' See United States v. Ramusack, 928 F.2d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying plain
error standard to bias argument raised for first time on appeal).
" See United States v. Baskes, 687 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating petitioner
bears "substantial burden" in overcoming presumption of judicial impartiality).
"2 See DaimlerChrv3sler, 294 F.3d at 701 (stating Fifth Circuit's precedent has "expressly declined" to adopt one specific test).
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approach to litigation that [the] Court [had] ever witnessed., 83 The Fifth
Circuit, citing various other opinions expressed by the district court judge,
held that the evidence of bias met the requirements for both tests. 84 In
DaimlerChrysler,the Fifth Circuit declined to delineate
a standard to gov85
ern mandamus petitions requesting reassignment.
IV. THE BROADENING SCOPE OF SUPERVISORY MANDAMUS
Public confidence in judicial independence is essential to the judiciary's legitimacy, especially during periods of intense political polarization.8 6 Recent political debate suggests that the citizenry values and demands an independent judiciary. 8 The judicial branch derives its power
from the citizenry's belief that the judicial process is a neutral one capable
of resolving legal disputes without regard to the political, socioeconomic,
cultural, or ethnic attributes of the parties.88 Therefore, preserving not only
the reality, but also the appearance of impartiality remains a fundamental
concern of the judiciary. 89
Although mandamus petitions requesting appellate review of
recusal motions circumvent the final decision rule, they perform a legitimate and important function by promoting public confidence in judicial
independence. 90 As the DaimlerChryslerdecision illustrates, however, the
maze of criteria employed by the courts of appeals in determining whether
or not to grant mandamus petitions ordering recusal and reassignment offers litigants little consistency across circuits. 91
The Fifth Circuit test allows appellate courts the flexibility to examine recusal issues on a case-by-case basis, weighing the facts and circumstances of each case with the importance of preserving the appearance of
83See id. (quoting district court judge's memorandum accompanying his order denying recusal motion).
84See id. (holding judge's hostility toward defendants, as evidenced by responses to
various defense motions, met standards of both tests). The appellate court also commented
that the district court judge's remarks during the course of the litigation indicated that it
would be "exceedingly difficult" for the judge to regain impartiality. h/.
85 See id. (holding "hostility" toward petitioners exhibited by district court judge
satisfies both tests).
86 See Denison, supra note 4 (describing political controversy generated by alleged
"judicial activism").
87 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing recent public debate
regarding impartiality of Supreme Court Justices).
88 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (quoting Supreme Court Justices regarding importance ofjudiciary's reputation).
89 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (citing Judicial Cannon of Ethics).
90 See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text (discussing mandamus and final
decision rule).
9' See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text (outlining various approaches to
appellate review of recusal motions employed by circuit courts).
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neutrality. 92 The Seventh Circuit procedural approach provides litigants
clear guidelines and preserves the presumption of judicial neutrality.93 A
test combining the flexibility of the Fifth Circuit's test with the clarity of
the Seventh's would prevent burdening the courts with frivolous and untimely mandamus petitions while promoting public confidence in the judicial process. 94
V. CONCLUSION
Recent public debate examining the impartiality of Supreme Court
Justices demonstrates that appearances do matter.
The American judicial system is a source of great pride to Americans; inextricably linked to that pride is the presumption that the system is
impartial and unbiased. Those who sit on the bench shoulder the burden of
upholding the integrity of the system not only in fact, but also in spirit.
Mandamus petitions seeking interlocutory appellate review of
recusal motions provide an important mechanism for promoting public
faith in the judicial process. Such petitions further the goal of ensuring that
all those who approach the courthouse door do so with utmost confidence
that justice is administered freely, unfettered by bias or predisposition.

Kiley Marie Corcoran

92 See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (describing recent Fifth Circuit case
applying broad, flexible approach to recusal motion review).
93 See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text (highlighting Seventh Circuit's
application of waiver to recusal motion analysis).
94 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (arguing liberal grant of recusal
motions may increase burden of courts and manipulation by litigants).

